Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Charles G. Oman v. The Industrial Commission of
the State of Utah, Peabody Coal Company
[Employer], Old Republic Insurance Company
[Insurance Carrier for the Employer], and the
Second Injury Fund of the State of Utah : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Virginius Dabney; Dabney and Dabney, P.C.; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Henry K. Chai II; Snow, Christensen and Martineau;
Attorney for Defendants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Oman v. The Industrial Commission, No. 860192.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1065

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Dnr&f

UTAH
DOCUMENT
(FU
50
A10
)OCKET NO.

%Lbl9o
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES G. OMAN,
Plaintiff,
•vsTHE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, PEABODY COAL
COMPANY [Employer], OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
[Insurance Carrier for the
Employer], and the SECOND
INJURY FUND OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,

Case No. 860192
Priority No. 6

Defendants.
BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF
ON WRIT OF REVIEW TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ.
DARNKY
r..
DABNEY & DARNFY.
DABNEY, pP.C.
Attorneys for Plaintifff
Kearns Building - Suit^
412
e -.IL
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-9000
DAVID L. WILKINSON, ESQ.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Attorneys for Industrial Commission
and the Second Injury Fund
Office of the Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-5261
HENRY K. CHAI II, ESQ.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Employer/Insurance Carrier
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box~45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Contents

* .

Table of Authorities

ii

Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal

,,., ,

Statement of Facts

1
1

Summary of Argument

. . .

Argument:

6

, . . . , . . . . , , . . . , , , „
I

II

THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AWARD RECOMPUTED TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF
BENEFITS ON APRIL 22, 1976, THE DAY
FOLLOWING HIS LAST DAY OF WORK

.6

THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO STATUTORY
INTEREST ON HIS PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AWARD

9

Conclusion

10

Certificate of Service
Addendum.

i

e.

. . , , . , . .

i

11

. . , . . , . . . . , .

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
Billings

Computer

Corporation

v. Tarango, Utah, 674 P.2d

(1983)...

..

104

8

Marshall v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 704 P.2d 581 (1985)

9

STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-64 (1973)

7

Utah Code Annotated §35-1-67 (1985)

4

Utah Code Annotated §35-1-78 (1981)

1, 6, 9

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This case presents two issues on appeal from the Industrial
Commission's final Order: first, whether the Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily

and capriciously

in failing to commence

permanent total disability benefits on the last day that he was
able to work; and second, whether the Industrial Commission erred
in refusing to award interest on the due and unpaid benefits payable to Plaintiff

in violation of Utah Code Annotated

§35-1-78

(1981).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May

12, 1975, Plaintiff

was

injured

in an

industrial

accident during the course of his employment as an underground
coal miner with Peabody Coal Company at the Deer Creek Coal Mine
in Huntington, Utah.

The accident

involved a cave-in in which

three of his fellow workers lost their lives and others, like
himself, were injured.
During
treated

the

month

orthopedically

Tr. Vol. II, p. 408.
after
for

the

accident,

traumatic

the

lumbosacral

Plaintiff
sprain

was
with

rediculitis unilateral on the left side, and psychiatrically for
depression caused by his feeling that he could have prevented one
of his co-workers

from being killed.

Tr. Vol. 1, p. 47.

He

complained of low back pain, restlessness, anxiety, nervousness
and

an

unwillingness

to go back

Vol. II, p. 408.
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to work

in

the mine.

Tr.

On June 15, 1975, and notwithstanding his physical and mental problems, the Plaintiff returned to work in the mines where
he continued to work without significant interruption until April
21, 1976.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 136.

During that time, Plaintiff con-

tinued to obtain chiropractic adjustments for his physical problems and therapy for his depression.
In May, 1976, Plaintiff sought follow-up medical treatment
for his back which had some limitation in motion and additional
tenderness in his left buttocks.

He also had decreased sensation

over the lateral aspect of his calf and foot on the left side.
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 167 and 409; and Vol. I, p. 47.
Subsequently, on June 29, 1976, a three-level

fusion was

performed by Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg at the L.D.S. Hospital in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 48; and Vol. II, p. 167.

Because two of the levels failed, a second surgery was performed
on December 1, 1977, where Plaintiff's back was again re-fused.
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 190-191 and 409.
On March 21, 1977, and as a result of those two surgeries,
the

Industrial

awarding

Commission

Plaintiff

approved

a 25% permanent

a

Compensation

partial

whole body for his orthopedic problems.

Agreement

impairment

of the

Tr. Vol. I, p. 24.

Over five years later, on June 11, 1982, Plaintiff filed an
Application for Hearing requesting an additional permanent partial impairment

award

for his

psychiatric

problems

and, also,

requesting consideration of a permanent total disability award.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 37.
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Dr. Potts, Plaintifffs treating physician of approximately
five

years,

confirmed

Plaintiff's

permanent

total

disability

status by letter on September 24, 1984 by stating that he was
11

. . . unable to work or perform steadily... ." and that he doubted

that

ff

. .. his position [would] improve11.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 156.

Dr. Bradford D. Hare of the University of Utah Pain Clinic confirmed

Plaintifffs

inability

to work, and

indicated

that

the

Plaintiff is impaired in social, family and vocational functioning, in a medical report of February 13, 1985.

This report fur-

ther substantiated Plaintifffs total disability status.

Tr. Vol.

II, p. 613.
Ms. JoAnn Pace of the Four Corners Community Mental Health
Center in Castle Dale, Utah also confirmed Plaintifffs permanent
total disability status by letter of May 21, 1985 indicating that
f!

. . . my impression at this time is that the employee is suffering

from post traumatic stress disorder with depression.

His rumina-

tion of the traumatic event, his anxiety and severe physical pain
could most definitely

prevent him from working

at this time11.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 613-614.
And finally, Dr. Ronald G. Rubin, a psychiatrist

in Price,

Utah, in a letter of July 10, 1985, pursuant to a Division of
Rehabilitation

referral,

indicated

that

Plaintiff

was

neither

rehabilitable now nor was he expected to be so in the future, was
not employable now or in the future, and was not able to partake
in a new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled.
p. 614.
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Tr. Vol. II,

On

October

Plaintiff's

9,

claim

1984, the Administrative
to

an

impairment, but found him

additional

award

Law Judge denied

for

his

psychiatric

!f

... tentatively permanently and total-

ly disabled and referred [him] to the Division of Rehabilitation
Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A."

Tr. Vol, II, p. 412.

On July 31, 1985, the Utah State Board of Education, Division of Rehabilitation Services, found that Plaintiff was ineligible

for rehabilitation because his handicap was "too severe"

and a recent psychiatric evaluation revealed that he had "... no
significant work potential....11

In addition to Plaintifffs phys-

ical and mental impairments, that Division also found that he had
borderline intellectual functioning and reading skills primarily
as a result of his dropping out of school in the tenth grade.
The Division
that

issued

the Section 67 certification by concluding

there was no ". . . reasonable

expectation

that

vocational

rehabilitation services [could] benefit [him] in terms of employability."

Tr. Vol. II, p. 562.

On December 11, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order finding that
the Plaintiff was
disability

fl

. . . entitled to benefits for permanent total

benefits

Vol. II, p. 564.

from

and

after

July

31,

1985...."

Tr.

The date chosen by the Adminsitrative Law Judge

for the commencement of benfits was the date of the Section 67
Division

of Rehabilitation

rehabilitation services.
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certification

of non-entitlement

Tr. Vol. II, p. 562.
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Plaintiff

timely

petitioned

this Court

for review of the

Industrial Commission's final administrative decision.

Tr. Vol.

II, p. 578.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is Plaintiff's contention that the Industrial Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ordered the payment of
permanent total disability benefits to commence on September 24,
1984.

Plaintiff contends that the proper date for the commence-

ment of such benefits is April 22, 1976 which

is the last day

Plaintiff was able to work as a coal miner and was forced out of
the work force by his industrial injury.
other evidence submitted
disabling
jury.

All of the medical and

supports Plaintiff's argument that his

symptoms are attributable

to his 1975 industrial in-

To select a date other than April 22, 1976 is an arbitrary

and capricious act.
And finally, Plaintiff contends that the Industrial Commission erred in refusing to award interest in compliance with Utah
Code Annotated §35-1-78 (1981).
trial Commission

Continued refusal of the Indus-

to comply with the statutory requirements and

this Court's interpretations thereof underscores the Industrial
Commission's tenuous position in this case.
ARGUMENT
I
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE
HI? PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AWARD
RECOMPUTED TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMMENCEM'ENT
OF BENEFITS ON APRIL 22, 1976, THE "DAY"
FOLLOWING HIS LAST DAY OF WORK
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It should be noted that Plaintiff1s argument is based upon
the long adhered

to Indutrial Commission rule that payment of

benefits shall commence on the date of the accident or the last
day an

injured

employee worked, whichever

is later.

Notwith-

standing that rule, the Industrial Commission for the first time
in 70 years has arbitrarily and capriciously discerned that a new
rule should be implemented regarding identifying the date for the
commencement of the payment of benefits.
What the Industrial Commission

is so vainly attempting to

conceal is its effort to arbitrarily limit the financial exposure
of the Second Injury Fund by fiat rather than by seeking appropriate legislative relief, thereby, once again, ignoring the recommendation of this Court that the Legislature is the appropriate
forum

to

limit

the

financial

exposure

of

the

Second

Injury

Fund.
By arbitrarily and capriciously picking a later onset date,
the financial exposure of the Second Injury Fund can be limited
without the authority of any statutory, regulatory or case law.
In fact, this arbitrary change in policy overrules 70 years of
the Commission's own procedural history.
This arbitrary and capricious choice of the Industrial Commission is wholly without cause and is not supported by any substantial

evidence.

Utah, 674 P.2d
the Workmen's

Billings

104 (1983).

Computer

Corporation

v. Tarango,

To preserve the remedial nature of

Compensation Act, and even the integrity of the

Industrial Commission, this Court must reverse the Commission's
decision in this case.

To fulfill the purpose of the Workmen's
-8-
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Plaintiff

further submits that the Industrial Commis-

sion's action in refusing to pay interest is additional evidence
of its arbitrary attempt to limit the financial exposure of the
Second Injury Fund.
CONCLUSION
The

Plaintiff

respectfully

requests

that

the

Industrial

Commission be directed, once again, to comply with the Workers'
Compensation statutory requirements of the law as they have been
interpreted by the decisions of this Court.

The clear and con-

sistent failure of the Industrial Commission to do so only exacerbates

injured

workers1

compensation

rights,

violates

the

remedial nature of Workers1 Compensation legislation, and further
and unnecessarily results in needless appeals being taken to this
Court for the purpose of reversing arbitrary and capricious decisions of the Industrial Commission.
the

Industrial

The final

Commission

should

be

administrative

decision

of

reversed

remanded

with direction to recompute the Plaintiff's

and

permanent

total disability benefits from April 22, 1976, with interest from
that date as required by the Code.
DATED this 18th day of August, 1/936

leys for Plaintiff
\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served

four

(4) true and correct

copies of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this the
18th day of August, 1986, upon the following:

David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Henry K. Chai III, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84Ti0

V1RG IfPl'U r'MftfTCY, [ E 4 .
A t t o r n e y s for
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF-UTAH

*
.... _.
•*
Appicant, *
*

CHARLES OMAN

•
•

vs.
PEABODY COAL COMPANY

*
(Employer) *

,.,.,,

I . . : . . , , .

OLD REPUBLIC COMPANIES

»

t

.**«>*.

COMPENSATIONAGREEMENT _-'
''•*i
y

\ / '

•'

'••</

*

(Insurance Carrier)
Defendant

•
*

*

WHEREAS,
Charles Oman
sustained a personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on the 12th day
of May
19.2? while employed by
Peabody Coal Company
;
which accident has been duly reported to the Industrial Commission of the State
of Utah. According to the physician's reports and agreement between the parties
hereto, said Applicant sustained, as a result of said accident, temporary total
disability and/or permanent partial disability, as well as Incurring medical and/
or hospital expenses, as hereinafter set forth:
May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and
1. Temporary total disability from
April 30, 1976
to Pecwnber 3 % 1976 inc.
payable at the rate of $ 95.33per week for a total of $ So^Z. i 1
.
*2i

3.

Permanent partial disability based on
73
weeks payable at the rate of
$ 95c33per week beginning January 1, ISJ//
7435.74
f o r a t o t a l of
Said permanent partial disability consists of the specific loss as follows:
25% permanent partial disability

/

Recapitulation of compensation benefits paid in connection with this elaim: \
(a) Medical—Hospital and Miscellaneous Incurred $ 4335.41
Paid to Date
$ 4Jib.4l
Note 1
Balance (if any) Due
$J!°JIe__
(b) Total Weekly Compensation Benefits Due
$ 3772.34
Paid to Date .
$ bb*Z.II
.
Balance (if any) Due
($ lS49.77)Note 2 /
(c) Total Medical and Compensation Due
/
per this Compensation Agreement:
$ 5535.97 A ^ n t l ,

-t>-

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of the amount stated in
Section 3 above—as provided by. law—the Applicant hereby releases Defendants
from any further responsibility in connection with said accident except as may
be changed from time to time under the powers of the Industrial Commission of
Utah to retain continuing jurisdiction to modify awards and extend medical
benefits.
It is understood that this Agreement becomes binding and effective only
when approved by a member of the Industrial Consiission of Utah.

C/^4 Ox*
^Wg
Approved this

%.\

day of

rtfs*^

Note 1: Travel and per diem of $351.90 was also paid. ' 7 I V w E*tif?WB&S
* Supporting medical evidence of permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y must accompany
t h i s form.
"ote 2 : 31 weeks compensation was paid a t rate of $155.00 in error.
NOTE: Original w i l l be retained by the Conmission. Signed copies w i l l be
returned to the Insurance Carrier.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 82002249

*
*
CHARLES G. OMAN,
Applicant,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or
OLD REPUBLIC and SECOND
INJURY FUND,

AND ORDER
*

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

BEFORE:
APPEARANCES:

*
* *

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24,
1984 at 1:00 p.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and.Notice of the Commission.
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.
The applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law.
^
The defendants, Peabody Coal Company and/or Old
Republic Insurance, were represented by Henry Chai,
Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund
Martinez, Administrator.

was

represented

by Gilbert

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The
occurrence of the accident is not questioned but the extent of injuries
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt.
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time
he was killed.
The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in
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the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine
timbers.
One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15,
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with radiculitis
unilateral on the left side.** He continued seeing a chiropractor quite
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also
went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent
or at what frequency these adjustments were administered. The records of the
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located.
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was
done in December of 1977.
4.
After the first surgery, the applicant entered into a
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery
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of June 29, 1976, Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion
had failed and that further surgery was recommended.
Liability for the
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the
permanent partial disability.
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980.
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total
disability.
6.
From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no
increase in the applicant's^ permanent partial impairment due to his back
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his
opinion as late as 1982. The only evidence of increased impairment relates to
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr.
Frank Dituri, a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the
applicant's psychiatric problems.
This evaluation was made without the
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr.
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri's earlier assessment of a 257. psychiatric
impairment.
Dr. Dituri
recently
responded
to
a request
from the
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident as having
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his records to finding no evidence of
ratable impairment as early as January, 1977 is based on his incorrect
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March
12, 1975.
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled.
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It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. The
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now,
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally
disabled.
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis.
The
surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable.
After this long length of time there is probably no realistic hope
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but
this only compounded the problems because it removed him *from active
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible.
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status.
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives:
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977
compensation
agreement
and therefore not subject to any statute of
limitations,
(2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and
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totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel
justified.
In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the
'•doctrine of res judicata...is not in the strict sense applicable to
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction
invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago.
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives.
As to the third perspective, that of the applicants claim for permanent total
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply -because the
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is
incumbent upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of
Brundage v. IML Freight. 622 P2d 790 (1980).
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before
the
evaluation
by
Rehabilitation
Services.
Obviously,
any
other
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification
of the prior compensation
agreement
entered
into in 1977 and the
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the
Commission's inability to do so.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively
permanently
and
totally
disabled
and
referred
to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time.% A further
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the
relevant information has been submitted.

Rich'ard G. Sums ion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 'A*day of October, 1984,
ATTEST:

/

\J(Y/KlAfrs7

Strasburg, Commission Secretary
(s

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on October tf . 1984 a copy of the attached ORDER
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 853
Castle Dale, Ut. 84513
Virginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
Suite 412, 136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Henry Chai
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The
occurrence of the accident - is not questioned but the extent of injuries
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt.
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time
he was killed. The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in
the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine
timbers. One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15,
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with rediculitis
unilateral on the left side.** He continued - seeing a chiropractor quite
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also
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went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent
or at what frequency- these adjustments were administered. The records of the
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located.
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was
done in December of 1977.
4.
After the first surgery, the applicant entered into a
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery
of June 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion
had failed and that further surgery was recommended.
Liability for the
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the
permanent partial disability.
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980.
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total
disability.

CHARLES OMAN
AMENDED ORDER
PAGE THREE

6.
From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no
increase in the applicant's permanent partial impairment due to his back
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his
opinion as late as 1982. The only evidence of increased impairment relates to
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr.
Frank Dituri,. a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the
applicant's psychiatric problems.
This evaluation was made without the
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr.
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who
essentially confirmed Dr. Diturivs earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric
impairment.
Dr. Tedrow recently
responded
to
a request from the
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident having
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his reference to "finding no evidence
of ratable impairment as early as January, 1977", is based on his incorrect
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March
12, 1975. A subsequent letter from Dr. Tedrow dated October 12, 1984
confirmed this typographical error and the pre-existing problem but he could
not rate it.
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled.
It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. The
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now,
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally
disabled.
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis.
The
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surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable.
After this long length of time there is probably no realistic hope
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but
this only compounded the problems because it removed him from active
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible.
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status.
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives:
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977
compensation
agreement and therefore not subject to any statute of
limitations,
(2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel
justified. In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the
"doctrine of res judicata...is not in the strict sense applicable to
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction

CHARLES OMAN
AMENDED ORDER
PAGE FIVE

invoiced, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago.
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives.
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a
relatively young man* It is not enough to presume that the applicant can
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is
incumbant upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of
Brundige v. IML Freight, 622 P2d 790 (1980).
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before
the
evaluation
by
Rehabilitation
Services.
Obviously,
any
other
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification
of the prior compensation
agreement entered
into in 1977 and the
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the
Commission's inability to do so.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively
permanently
and
totally
disabled
and
referred
to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time. A further
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the
relevant information has been submitted.

Richard G. Sums ion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the industrial Commission of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah, this. *Jy> -day of October, 1984,
ATTEST:

& '/<?
"Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on October/^S > 1984 a copy of the attached
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Charles G. Oman
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A

irginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
Suite 412, 136 South Main
Salt Lake. City, Utah 84101
Henry Chai
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SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24,
1984, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company
and/or Old
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai,
II, Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A.
Martinez, Administrator.

FURTHER HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 14,
1985, at 10:00 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or Old
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai,
II, Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V.
Boorman, Administrator.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were entered in
this matter on October 9, 1984, and an Amended Order was entered on October
23, 1984. Insofar as the Findings of Fact expressed in the two prior Orders
are not inconsistent with the Findings made herein, the same are incorporated
herein by reference as though fully set forth.
2. The original Order made a tentative finding that the Applicant
was permanently and totally disabled, and he was referred to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training, and certification as
required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. There was a specific finding made that no
compensation for permanent total disability was to be awarded until a final
determination was made relative to that issue.
3. At the last hearing on November 14, 1985, evidence was introduced relative to the rehabilitation evaluation. The Applicant underwent
feasibility studies and was placed in a program where he received tutoring in
basic skills. He made positive but slow progress for a while; but finally on
July 31, 1985, Rehabilitation Services certified that the Applicant did not
meet or no longer met the legal requirement of a reasonable expectation that
vocational rehabilitation services would benefit him in terms of employability. The reason for the certification that the Applicant is not a good
candidate for rehabilitation appears to be threefold: (1) He has borderline
intellectual functioning and reading skills; (2) he suffers from a long-term
depressive neurosis; and (3) he lacks funds that might otherwise enable him to
pursue a long-term rehabilitation program.
4. At the last hearing the Defendants presented a substantial
amount of evidence relative to the Applicant's activities over the past
several years. The thrust of this evidence was to establish that the
Applicant was in fact a partner with his wife in the operation of Kelly's Bar
in Castledale, U*ah, and that he h3d also formerly been involved with his wife
in the operation of Chick's Fish *N Chips. The evidence also strongly implies
that the Applicant derived an unspecified amount of income from Christmas tree
sales. The Applicant testified that the Christmas tree sales were actually an
attempt on the part of his teenage daughter to earn some income and that he
was not involved in this business even though many of the customers wrote out
checks in his name in payment for the trees. He further testified that the
bar and restaurant operations were operated solely by his wife and that his
name appeared on licenses, tax returns, sales invoices, lease agreements,
et cetera, only for the purpose of credit or other business needs but was
never intended tokan actual partnership.
Some of the evidence presented
showed rather clearly that a lot of personal expenses were being run through
the business accounts, and the evidence rather clearly indicated the Applicant
spent quite a bit of time at the bar and that perhaps he even helped out on
occasion to a limited extent. It seems rather clear from the evidence that
the townspeople regarded the Applicant and his wife as the owners and
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operators of these businesses even though the Applicant's time involvement was
much less than that of his wife.
5. Tax returns filed by the Applicant and his wife were submitted
after the hearing for the years 1979 through 1984. In each case these were
joint returns, but for each year they showed the income and expenses of
Kelly's Bar as a sole proprietorship operated by Charles Oman. The returns
reflect substantial gross receipts from the bar, but the net income for the
years 1979 through 1982 showed either a loss or only nominal net income.
Clearly, if the only thing derived by the Applicant and his wife from the
operation of the bar was the amount reflected as net profit on the tax return,
the operation of the bar could not be justified. The net profit would not
even have been the equivalent of a minimum wage paid to part-time hired help.
The average net profit for the years 1979 through 1983 was only 2.57 percent,
of gross sales. There was an unexplained increase in net profit during 1983
and 1984 even though gross sales remained about the same as they had been
previously-. The net profit in 1983 jumped to 12.86 percent of gross sales,
and the net profit jumped to 20.07 percent in 1984. The last two figures are
believable and would justify the operation of the business. Although the
income from the first four years is suspect, there may be an adequate
explanation; but such an explanation is not deemed important to the issue
relative to the Applicant's permanent total disability.
6. All of the evidence presented from the Applicant's doctors and
from rehabilitation counselors supports the Applicant's claim for permanent
total disability. The prospects of successful rehabilitation are not good,
but there is the suggestion that such might still be accomplished if the
Applicant had sufficient funds to sustain him during a long-term rehabilitation program.
7. A considerable amount of time was spent at the last hearing
reviewing a substantial number of checks made out to the Applicant, many of
which were under $100.00 but soma of which were in excess of $100.00 and in
some cases more than $500.00. The Applicant said that these did not represent
income in any way but were checks simply written out by customers who wanted
cash and the Applicant and his wife were willing to cash these checks for
them. The Administrative Law Judge is hardly convinced of any sound business
purpose being furthered by this practice, but there is no specific evidence of
any other purpose. These checks are in addition to the hundred or so checks
written out to the Applicant for Christmas trees. Most of the Christmas trees
appear to have sold for $15.00, with the price range being $10.00 to $20.00.
8. All of the evidence presented by the Defendants was convincing
in showing the Applicant is far from being totally invalid. His activity
level is such that Dave Owens, a captain in the Emery County Sheriff's Office,
did not even know that he was disabled even though he saw him frequently.
Lamar Guymon, sheriff of Emery County, testified that he had observed the
Applicant limping as he walked but he also saw the Applicant frequently during
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the course of a month and knew of his involvement in the operation of Kelly's
Bar.
9. In consideration of all of the evidence presented, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Applicant is permanently and totally
disabled, but at the same time believes this determination should be subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission.
This is admittedly
paradoxical but is based upon the belief that the Applicant's unemployability
is in large part a result of his long-term depressive neurosis condition and
that such might change if the Applicant had a strong enough desire to become
employed despite his known physical limitations. It obviously will not change
absent a change in attitude.
10. The Applicant's combined physical and mental impairment is
44 percent of whole body function* The Defendants entered into a compensation
agreement with the Applicant in 1977 by which he was paid permanent partial
disability for his 25 percent physical impairment, but nothing has ever been
paid for his depressive neurosis. The Applicant's rate of compensation was
$95.33 per week. This is less than the minimum amount payable as of the time
the Applicant was certified as not being a candidate for rehabilitation on
July 31, 1985. The minimum rate in effect at that time was $120.00 per week.
The Defendant Insurance Carrier and its insured have no further liability in
this matter except for the payment of ongoing medical expenses because the
Applicant did not become permanently and totally disabled until after the
expiration of the initial six-year period.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Applicant is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability
from and after July 31, 1985, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission to review and amend as circumstances may require.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund preprre the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week
commencing July 31, 1985, and continuing thereafter at intervals of not more
than every four weeks until further Order of the Commission. The accrued
amount shall be payable in a lump sum,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or
Old Republic Insurance pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of this
accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical
Fee Schedule of this Commission.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his
attorney as may be ordered by the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
//&*
day of December, 1985.
ATTEST:

Linda J. StxpMburg
Commissidp^Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on December
//
1985, a copy of the attached
Supplemental Order in the case of Charles G. Oman issued December
//
1985, was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
"Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law
Kearns Building, Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 853
Castledale, UT 84513
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VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ., #0795
DABNEY St DABNEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Applicant
Kearns Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-9000
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MOTION FOR REVIEW
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PEABODY COAL COMPANY [Employer}, OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY [Insurance
Carrier for the Employer], and the
SECOND INJURY FUND OF THE STATE OF
UTAH,
Defendants.

Case Mb. 82002249
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COMES NOW che Applicant, pursuant co che UCah Workers' Compensation and

15

Occupational Disease statutes, and Che Rules and Regulations of che Utah

2C

Industrial Cannission, inter alia, and requests che Industrial Carmission Co

21

review the Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Che

22

Administrative Law Judge of December 11, 1985 relative Co che onset data of

23

permanent cocal disability benefits, and interest, only, and in'suDport Chere-

24.

of, alleges and represents as follows:

25

1. That Che Supplemental Order of December 11, 1985 specifically pro-

26

vides chat the cannenceaent date of permanent total disability benefics is che

27

data of che Rehabilitation Services letter certifying chat Che Applicant was

23
3 A B N Z T * DA»BSfEY
<CA«N» SUIU31NO SUlTT *tt
$A . " «AK« Z ~v .•**-* J4IOI
"T.I»"flM
iS'IS 40CO

1
«i not a candidate for reasonable vocational rehabilitation services, namely

2

!; July 31, 1985.
2.

4

That computing permanent total disability benefits based upon the

date of the rehabilitation letter is inconsistent with long standing Indus-

5

6 , t r i a l Connission policy wherein permanent total disability benefits onset
i

7*

dates are computed frcm the date of the employee's industrial accident, or the
|j date the employee last worked, whichever is later. Permanent total disability
Ji is computed frcm that date on a permanent total disability weekly benefits
1

basis with all temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation

jj deducted fran that amount for the purpose of determining Che continuation date
-

of permanent total disability benefits,

.1

3. That counsel is not aware of any other permanent total disability

. , canmencement date in any other claim ever being held to commence with Che date

iC P
1o i

of a State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certification letter,

-g

and chat the only reason for doing so would be to lessen Che financial expos-

i

-- »' ure of anploeyrs, and in Chis case, Che Second Injury Fund.
ij

-g •

4 . That Che July 31, 1985 onset date is contrary Co numerous findings by

i

«iq

Che Commission, and other matters contained in Che medical evidence which

2Q |j argue for an earlier date, assuning that Che computation basis normally used
2i l» by che Industrial Connission should in one manner or another b e rodified:
7

29

specifically, the appropriate dates relative Co che permanent total disability

2~

question in chis case are as follows:

24 ,

a. The date of the industrial accident was tMay 12, 1975.

25 J

b. The Applicant has not worked since 1976; in fact, the Adminis-

i

2Q , trative Law Judge in the Amended Order of October 23, 1984 specifically found
27

Chat "... che Applicant has not been gainfully employed for Che oast eigne

23

years*" Amended Order, p. 5 (emphasis added).

1 '
''

c.

The Application alleging permanent

total disability is dated

3 ! June 11, 1982 and it was filed on August 19, 1982.
d.
The f i r s t hearing held in t h i s matter
iji

ll

involving, anong other

things, the issue of permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y , was held on September 29,
1984.

','
7

e.

Dr. P o t t s , the Applicant's treating physician of approximately

ii

!| five years, indicated the Applicant's permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y status on
jj September 24, 1984 by stating that he " . . . unable to work or perform steadily

I

| ...." and that he doubted that " . . . his position [would] improve".

10 jj

Hearing

j| Exhibit No. A-l.
-

'

f.

The Administrative Law Judge in the Amended Order of October 23,

1984 specifically concluded that " . . . the facts warrant a tentative finding of
14 11 Peraanent and t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . . . . "
- - ii

g.

Amended Order, p'. 5 (emphasis added).

The State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services ccnmenced

.

'i vocational f e a s i b i l i t y studies of the Applicant in October, 1984 and attempted

1T

«i to r e h a b i l i t a t e the Applicant for a period of almost nine months, a l l without

1Q

jj success.

1Q

ij

See Hearing Exhibit No. A-19.
h.

The Administrative Law Judge by l e t t e r to the State Office of

2Q ji Education Rehabilitation Services referred the Applicant for vocational rehab2-j Ij i l i t a t i o n by that agency on November 15, 1984.
i!

22 *

i.

Dr. Bradford D. Hare of

the University of Utah Pain Clinic

~2 •! indicated that the Applicant was unable to work, and was impaired in social,
24 Ii family and vocational functioning,

in a medical report dated February 13,

25 |; 1985, further substantiating his t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y s t a t u s .
2g ji

j .

Ms. JoArm Pace of

the Four Comers Community Mental Health

27 ;. Center in Castle Dale, Utah further substantiated the Applicant's permanent
23

t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y by l e t t e r of May 21, 1985 by indicating that " . . . ny impres-3-

1
sion at this time is that the Applicant

is suffering

frcm past traunatic

2
stress disorder with depression. His runination of the traunatic event, his
3,
j anxiety and severe physical pain could most definitely prevent him fran work-

4 •

|iI .

... . ,.

j ing at this time.
5'
is
k. Dr. Donald L. Ruben, a psychiatrist in Price, Utah, pursuant to
6i
a rehabilitation referral, indicated that the Applicant was not rehabilitable
now or in the future, was not apployable now or in the future, and was not
!I able to partake in j^ new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled, in a lecter
9

it

„ V dated July 10, 1985.
10 j ,
'l

1.

Even the Administrative Law Judge's Supplemental Order of Decern-

ber 11, 1985 emphasizes that " a l l of the evidence presented from the Appliio

cant's doctors and from rehabilitation counselors supports the Applicant's

1C

claim for permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y " (emphasis added). In this regard, the
'" several medical reports, principally from Dr. Potts [09/24/84], the Four

lb

Corners Mental Health agency [05/21/85] and Dr. Ruben [07/10/85], strongly

16
.„ ! infer that the Aoolicant was permanently and totally disabled at least as
1 / 'i

ifl ,!
-Q ,|

_ _ — _ - _ _ _ — _ _ _ eac

^y

_ -

,—

s

2 September 24, 1984, by medical records and opinions alone!
5.

That because the onset date selected by the Administrative Law Judge

2 0 , of July 31, 1985, the date of the State Office of Education Rehabilitation
21 |j Services c e r t i f i c a t i o n

l e t t e r , clearly constitutes an error in law, i t

is

22

respectfully requested that the onset date be computed in accordance with the

23

usual and customary Incustrial Cannission practice as referred

to above.

24 1 Unquestionably, the earlier Application date (June 11, 1982), the filing date
25 ' ! (August 19, 1982), the f i r s t medical opinion l e t t e r of permanent t o t a l d i s 2g •! a b i l i t y (September 24, 1984), and the date of the tentative finding of perma27

nent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y conclusion by the Administrative Law Judge (October 23,

2g

1984) agree strongly for an earlier onset date.
-4-

In suggesting these a l t e m a -

1

, tive dates, however, Che Applicant is not in any way waiving his position that
i

2 j; the usual and custcmary practice of Che Industrial Cannission Co carmence
3 | benefits as of the date of Che accident, or Che date of last employment, with
4 I appropriate offsets for temporary total compensation and permanent partial
5 II canpensation being made, is in reality, Che appropriate way Co ccmpute permanent total disability benefits owed Co .Mr. Oman in chis case.
6. That in addition, it should also be noted Chat pursuant Co UCah Code
Annotated 535-1-78 (1981), the Applicant is also enticled Co interest on all
amounts fran the point in Cime when Chey were otherwise due and payable, which
10 11 such interpretation of Section 78 has recently been upheld by the Utah Supreme
11

Court in Che decision of Marshall v. Industrial Commission, (1985),

1

fore, Co Che exCenC Chat Che Supplenental Order of Decanber 11, 1985 does not

2

There-

^3 «f include a provision for interest, it should also be accordingly modified.
14 j

WHEREFORE, Che Applicant respectfully requests Chat an appropriate and

jl

'*
1

earlier onset date be made in chis case, and Chat an appropriate award be made

® ,l for interest pursuant to Section 78 in accordance with Che UCah Supreme Court

' ' I recant ruling on chat question.
18
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DATED this 19th day of December, 1985.

j|

D£&NEY|& DABNEY,/?.C
VIKSttd^ DABNEXTESQ X
Attorneys for Applicant
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I hereby certify that I trailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing

2g !! docunent, postage prepaid, on chis Che 19th day of December, 1985, Co che
27 •!i following:

1

2
3

Utah Industrial Cannission
160 East 300 South
P. 0. Box 45580

4

Salt Lake City, Utah

5

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
160 East 300 South
P . O . Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
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7
3
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10
11

84145-0580

Henry K. Chai II, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
9 Exchange Place, 12th Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Mr. Charles G. Oman
P. 0. Box 853
Castle Dale, Utah 84513
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 82002249

CHARLES G. OMAN,
Applicant,
vs.

*
*

*
*
PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or
*
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE and
*
SECOND INJURY FUND,
*
*
Defendants.
*
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER
GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

On December 11, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding
the Applicant in the above captioned case permanent total disability benefits,
to be paid by the Second Injury Fund beginning July 31, 1985, the date when
the State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certified that the
Applicant was not susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the
Applicant's attorney filed a Motion for Review objecting to the date payments
were ordered to begin.
The Counsel for the Applicant argues that the
Commission practice has been to award permanent total disability benefits
either beginning the date the employee was injured, or the date the employee
ceased working. The Counsel for the Applicant also requested an award of
interest on the benefits awarded. The Commission is of the opinion that an
earlier date is appropriate for the beginning of the permanent total
disability benefits, however the Commission declines adding interest to the
award. A brief review of tha fila follows.
The Applicant was injured, while in the course of his employment, on
May 12, 1975 in a mine cave-in. The Applicant injured his back, and had two
back surgeries as a result.
The Applicant also experienced considerable
psychiatric problems resulting from the trauma involved in the cave-in (in
which several miners were killed).
The Applicant returned to work
approximately one month after the cave-in, and worked for almost a year
afterwards, during which time he saw a chiropractor.
In June 1976, the
Applicant had back surgery (performed by Dr. T. Soderberg) and the Applicant
was deemed stabilized in December 1976. The Defendant/carrier paid temporary
total compensation in 1975 and 1976 for the periods the Applicant did not
work, and also paid for a 25% permanent partial impairment rated by Dr.
Soderberg in December 1976. The Applicant required additional surgery in
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December 1977 as a result of non-fusion, and the Defendant/carrier paid for
the surgery and the attendant temporary total disability. The Applicant was
declared stable in September 1978, and no further permanent partial
impairment, beyond the 25% already awarded, resulted.
On August 18, 1982, the Applicant, through counsel, filed an
Application for Hearing with the Commission, claiming permanent total
disability benefits, or additional permanent partial impairment benefits. In
support of the claim, in November 1983, the Counsel for the Applicant
submitted two physician reports.
Both reports discussed the Applicant's
psychiatric impairment resulting from the May 12, 1975 accident, and one of
the reports rated the impairment at 25% of the whole man. The Defendants
denied a claim for further permanent partial impairment benefits based on the
8 year Statute of Limitation specified in U.C.A. 35-1-66. The Counsel for the
Applicant argued that the Statute of Limitation did not apply because the
issue was permanent total disability for which the Supreme Court determined no
Statute of Limitation applied, and because the Commission had continuing
jurisdiction under U.C.A. 35-1-78. A Hearing was held September 24, 1984, and
the Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on October 9, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge made a tentative
finding of permanent total disability, and the Applicant was referred to the
State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services. On November 14, 1985, a
second Hearing was held to allow testimony regarding the Applicant's
empioyability. This issue arose when it was determined the Applicant may have
had some involvement in several businesses in which his wife and daughter were
engaged.
The final Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, now at issue, was filed on December 11, 1985. In that Order, the
Administrative Law Judge found the Applicant permanently totally disabled as a
result of Rehabilitation Services' inability to rehabilitate the Applicant
after nearly one year of attempts. The Administrative Law Judge ordered the
Second Injury Fund to begin permanent total disability benefits as of July 31,
1985, the date Rehabilitation Services certified the Applicant as not
susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the Commission received
the Applicant's Motion for Review arguing for an earlier date when permanent
total disability should begin, and requesting an award of interest on the
final awprd. The Counsel for the Applicant submits a long list of alternative
earlier dates that should have been selected by the Administrative Law Judge
as the beginning of permanent total disability. These include, May 12, 1975
the date of injury; sometime in 1976 when the Applicant ceased working; June
11, 1982 the date of the Application for Hearing; August 19, 1982 the date the
Application was filed; September 24, 1984 when the Applicant's treating
physician first found the Applicant to be permanently totally disabled;
October 23, 1984, the date the Administrative Law Judge tentatively found the
Applicant to be permanently totally disabled; November 15, 1984, the date the
Applicant was referred to Rehabilitation Services, February 13, 1985, when the
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University of Utah Pain Clinic doctor found the Applicant disabled; May 21,
1985, when a cotmnunity health center employee found the Applicant was
prevented from working; and finally, June 10, 1985 when a psychiatrist found
the Applicant was not employable or rehabilitative.
The Commission is of the opinion that the first date of medical
confirmation of the Applicant's permanent total disability status is a more
appropriate date to begin permanent total disability benefits. The Commission
therefore finds the benefits should begin as of September 24, 1984. The
Commission finds that an award of interest is inappropriate, and therefore the
final Commission award is as follows.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week
commencing September 24, 1984, and continuing thereafter at intervals of not
more than every four weeks until further order of the Commission. The accrued
amount shall be payable in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Peabody Coal Company
and/or Old Republic Insurance, pay all medical "expenses incurred as the result
of this accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and
Surgical Fee Schedule of the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
AppLicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his
attorney as may be ordered by the Commission\

Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman \
~ Walter. T. Axelgard,/_ Comjdssdonfer
Lenice L. Nielsen, Commissioner
passed by the Industrial Commission
of Jjtah, Salt Lake City, Utah this
/jflrW of March, IS

Linda J. Strasburg, Commission

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on March
I*?
1986, a copy of the attached
Granting Motion for Review in the case of Charles G. Oman issued March Z_7
, 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses,
postage paid:
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator of the Second Injury Fund
Henry K. Chai, II, Atty., P.O. Box 3000, SLC, UT 84110
Virginius Dabney, Atty., 136 South Main, Suite 412, SLC, UT 84101
Charles G. Oman, P.O. Box 853, Castledale, Utah 84513
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Br -^$<*-Z£&
Carol Olson
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